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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRISTAM B. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Civil No. 8522 
ROSWELL MILLER, III, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tristam B. Johnson, plaintiff and respondent, 
commenced this action against Roswell Miller, de-
fendant and appellant, on the 8th day of November, 
1955, (R.6) to recover damages for alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation of plaintiff's 
former wife, I-Ielen Harris Johnson ( R. 1-4) . 
Plaintiff took defendant's deposition on the 13th 
day of January, 1956, (R. 47-48). Defendant re-
fused to answer certain questions propounded to de-
fendant at the taking of said deposition, which de-
position is a part of the record herein (R. 60-61). 
Thereafter on the 22nd day of March, 1956, the 
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trial court entered an order requiring defendant 
to answer said questions and assessing attorney's 
fees against defendant in the amount of $100.00 on 
the ground that defendant's refusal to answer the 
questions was without substantial justification 
( R. 4 7-48) . From this order defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
(a) THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION 
OF AFFECTIONS AND CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
ARE ABOUSHED BY STATUTE IN THE JURISDIC-
TIONS CONCERNING WHICH SAID QUESTIONS 
WERE ASKED. 
(b) SINCE THE ACTS OF APPELLANT IN SAID 
JURISDICTIONS HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT, AP-
PELLANT WAS PRIVILEGED NOT TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTIONS BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 78-24-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
POINT II 
SAID ORDER VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THAT THE ANSWERS TO 
SAID QUESTIONS WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE 
APPELLANT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ASSESSING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF THE RECORD 
As heretofore noted respondent commenced this 
action on the 8th day of November, 1955 (R. 5). On 
the 13th day of January, 1956, prior to the time 
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that appellant had ansvvered respondent's complaint 
(R. 14) and prior to the time that appellant was re-
quired to answer respondent's complaint (R. 11), 
respondent took appellant's deposition on oral in-
terrogatories ( R. 4 7-48) . 
At the taking of said deposition respondent 
propounded certain questions t_Q_Jlppellant concern-
ing appellant's relationships with ~espondent's for-
mer wife in the states of New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho and Canada. 
See appellant's deposition and record 25-42. Both 
the preliminary and ultimate questions propounded 
by respondent at the taking of said deposition were 
directed at the relationships between appellant and 
respondent's former wife and were particularly di-
rected at establishing the fact that appellant had had 
sexual intercourse with respondent's former wife. 
Appellant refused to answer such questions. There-
after appellant filed his answer on January 24, 1956 
(R. 14-15). 
Appellant also filed amendments to his answer 
in which he pleaded as affirmative defenses the laws 
of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada 
and Wyoming abolishing the causes of action for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
(R. 16-17, 21-22, 19-20). 
On the 22nd day of March, 1956, pursuant to 
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respondent's motion, the court entered an order re-
quiring appellant to answer the questions propound-
ed to him at the taking of his deposition and assess-
ing attorney's fees against appellant on the ground 
that appellant's refusal to answer the questions was 
without substantial justification (R. 4 7 -48). 
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the sta-
tutes of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Nev-
ada and Wyoming abolishing the causes of action for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
were in evidence and before the court at the hearing 
of said motion (R. 43-44, 21-22). 
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the sta-
tutes of the aforesaid jurisdictions subjecting appel-
lant to danger of prosecution for adultery and the 
statutes of the United States subjecting appellant 
to danger of criminal prosecution for transporting 
a female in interstate and foreign commerce for im-
moral purposes were in evidence and before the court 
on the hearing of said motion (R. 44-45). 
POINT I 
(a) THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION 
OF AFFECTIONS AND CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
ARE ABOLISHED BY. STATUTE IN THE JURISDIC-
TIONS CONCERNING WHICH SAID QUESTIONS 
WERE ASKED. 
At all ti1nes n1aterial to this action, appellant, 
respondent and respondent's former wife resided 
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and were domiciled in the State of New Jersey 
(R. 5, appellant's deposition pp. 4-8, 25-26). As 
above set forth respondent propounded specific ques-
tions as to appellant's acts and relationships with 
respondent's former wife in New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming. The causes of 
action for alienation of affections and criminal con-
versation are abolished by statute in said jurisdic-
tions. The preambles to the statutes, declaring the 
public policy of those states with reference to the 
causes of action, and the provisions of the statutes 
are in substance the same. See: Chapter 279, Laws 
of New Jersey, 1935, Sections 23-1 through 23-6 of 
Title 2-A of the Revised Statutes of the State of 
New Jersey; Sections 61-a through 61-i of Article 
2-A of the Civil Practice Act of the State of New 
York; Chapter 36, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1941, 
Chapter 3, Sections 512 through 516 of the Wyom-
ing Compiled Statutes, 1945; No. 189, Laws of Penn-
sylvania, 1935, Title 48, Sections 170 through 177, 
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, 1936; and, Chap-
ter 53, Laws of Nevada, 1943, Sections 4071 through 
4071.07, Nevada Compiled Laws of 1929, 1949 Sup-
plement. The New Jersey statute, Chapter 279, 
Laws of New Jersey, 1935, reads as follows: 
"AN ACT declaring and carrying into effect 
th.e public policy of the State of New Jersey 
w1th respect to causes of action for alienation 
of the affections, criminal conversation, seduc-
r· u 
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tion, and breach of contract to marry, actions 
thereon, contracts with respect thereto and 
acts and proceedings in connection therewith. 
WHEREAS, The remedies herein provided 
for by law for the enforc~ment of actions 
based upon alleged alienation of affections, 
criminal conversation, seduction and breach 
of contract to marry have been subjected to 
grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, 
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary 
damage to many persons wholly innocent and 
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely--the 
victims of circumstances, and such remedies 
having been exercised by- UJ1scrupulous per-
sons for their unjust enrichment and such 
remedies having furnished vehicles for the 
commission or attempted commission of crime 
and in many cases have resulted in the per-
petration of frauds, it is hereby declared as 
the public policy of the State of New Jersey 
that the best interests of the people of the 
State will be served by the abolition of such 
remedies. Consequently, in the public interest, 
the necessity for the enactment of this. arti~le 
is hereby declared as a n1atter of legislative 
detern1ination; therefore, 
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General 
Assembly of the State of New Jersey: 
1. The rights of action heretofore exist-
ing to recover sums of money as damage for 
the alienation of affections, criminal conver-
sation, seduction, or breach of contract to 
n1arry are hereby abolished. 
* * * * 
4. No act hereafter done _U)ithin-·-fhis· 
State sh-all operate to give rise, either w_ithin .. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or without this State, to any of the rights .of 
aetioii" cibolfihed by this article. * * * (ItaliCS 
added.) 
5. It shall hereinafter be unlawful for 
any person either as a party or attorney, or 
an agent o~ other person in ~ehalf of either, 
to file or serve, cause to be filed or served or 
threaten to file or serve, or to threaten to 
cause to be filed or served, any process or 
pleading, in any court of the State setting 
forth or seeking to recover a sum of money 
upon any cause of action abolished or barred 
by this article, whether such cause of action 
arose within or without the state. 
6. All contracts and instruments of 
every kind, name, nature or description, which 
may hereafter be executed within this State 
in payment, satisfaction, settlement or com-
promise of any claim or cause of action 
abolished or barred by this article, whether 
such claim or cause of action arose within or 
without this State, are hereby declared to be 
contrary to the public policy of this State 
and absolutely void. It shall be unlawful to 
cause, induce or procure any person to execute 
such a contract or instrument; or cause, in-
duce or procure any person to give, pay, trans-
fer or deliver any money or thing of value in 
p~yment, satisfaction,. settlement or compro-
mise of any such claim or cause of action· 
or to . receive, take or accept any such money 
or thing of value as such payment, satisfac-
tion, settlement or compromise. It shall be 
unlawful to commence or cause to be com-
menced, either ~s party or att~rney, or as 
agent or otherwise In behalf of either, in any 
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court of this State, any proceeding or action 
seeking to enforce or recover upon any such 
contract or instrument, knowing it to be such, 
whether the same shall have been executed 
within or without this state * * *. 
7. Any person who shall violate any of 
the provisions of this article shall be guilty of 
a felony which shall be punishable by a fine of 
not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.-
00), or by imprisonment for a term of not 
less than one year nor more than five years, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in 
the discretion of the court. (The penalty has 
since been reduced to a misdemeanor in New 
Jersey. It remains a felony in other jurisdic-
tions.) 
8. This article shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate the objects and purposes 
thereof and the public policy of the State as 
herelby declared. * * *" 
The aforesaid statutes as a matter of declared 
public policy abolish said actions and provide that 
no act or acts done within those jurisdictions shall 
operate to give rise, either within or without said 
jurisdictions, to any of the rights of action set forth 
in respondent's complaint. 
Counsel for appellant has made a detailed 
search of the authorities under both the federal and 
state rules of civil procedure and the codes of civil 
procedure. This search has failed to disclose any de-
cisions on the precise question presented herein, 
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to-wit, whether or not a pl_aintif! i~_ -~n action for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
brought in a state recognizing such actions may go 
into acts claimed to have occurred in a state or states 
in which such actions have as a matter of declared 
public policy been abolished by statutes that specifi-
cally provide that no act or acts done in such states 
shall have operative effect either within or without 
such states. 
In a very similar situation that was in prin-
ciple the same as the matter presented here the New 
York court refused to permit discovery by the plain-
tiffo See In Re Glasser (1950) 100 N.Y.S. 2d 723. 
In the Glasser case the plaintiff instituted an action 
for alienation of affections in the State of Connecti-
cut where such actions are recognized. In the course 
of the proceedings the plaintiff sought to force dis-
covery of evidence of certain actions of the defen-
dant within the State of New York. The New York 
court refused to permit the discovery on the ground 
that the New York statute had abolished the cause 
of action for alienation of affections. In so holding 
the New York court quoted verbatim the statute 
abolishing causes of action for alienation of affec-
tions and criminal conversation and, in particular, 
that part of the statute that expressly provides that 
no act or acts done within the State of New York 
shall operate to give rise, either within or without 
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the state, to any of the rights thereby abolished. 
The questions asked by respondent were di-
rected specifically to the social relationships and the 
fact of sexual intercourse between appellant and 
·respondent's former wife in New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming, where the 
causes of action for alienation of affections and cri-
minal conversation are abolished by statute. 
The questions · sought to elicit answers as to 
specific instances and as to specific acts in the juris-
dictions above named. An examination of appellant's 
deposition, pages 1 to 37, shows the questions fol-
lowed the same general pattern, to-wit: 
( 1) Were you alone with Helen in the 
State of New Jersey or New York? 
( 2) Did you register as man and wife 
in a hotel in New York? 
(3) Did you have sexual relations with 
Helen in the State of New Jersey or New 
York? 
The acts and conduct of appellant and respon-
dent's former wife cannot, under the express word-
ing of said statutes, operate to give rise to any rights 
in favor of respondent either within or without said 
states. To require appellant to answer these ques-
tions would be directly in the teeth of the declared 
public policy of said statutes, which is to prevent 
abuse and humiliation and directly in the teeth of 
10 
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Rules 30(b), 30(d) and 37(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which rules expressly provide for protec-
tion of parties and witnesses from examination that, 
as in the case before this court, subjects the depon-
ent to annoyance, embarrassment and oppression~ 
That the law of the place where the acts of ap-
pellant are claimed to have occurred determines 
whether or not such acts have operative effect or 
give rise to any rights in favor of respondent, see: 
15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, Sec. 12, p. 897; Buhler 
v. Maddison (1947) 109 U. 267, 176 P. 2d 118; 
Pringle v. Gibson ( 1937) 135 Me. 297, 195 A. 695. 
Professor Wigmore, in discussing the question 
of whether or not the law of the place where the acts 
occur or the law of the forum determines the ques-
tion of admissability of evidence, reviews the auth-
orities and concludes that the law of the forum deter-
mines the admissability of evidence, Vol. 1, Wig-
more, On Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5. He goes on to 
state, ibid, p. 162 : 
"But there are certain apparent excep-
tions to it (the rule that the admissability of 
evidence is determined by reference to the law 
of the forum) which are in truth instances of 
separate principles and need to be distin-
guished: 
" ( 1) Some rule of substantive law as to 
the validity of an act, in form or in essentials, 
may be adopted from the foreign law, because 
11 
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of the party's domicile or of the place of the 
transaction; and thus a question may arise 
whether a particular requirement is a rule of 
evidence or a rule of substantive law." 
He then reviews the authorities, ibid, pp. 162-
164, to the effect that where the law of the place 
where the acts occur makes such acts invalid in the 
sense of not having operative effect, evidence as to 
the acts is inadmissable under the law of the forum-
~n th~ugh~by~the law o:(the~forum -such acts-would 
have·- had- opei~ative effect.--The -following are .. ex-
- .. · ...... · .. , .. - ~ 
amples. -whether or -not oral evidence is admissable 
to vary the terms of a written contract is determined 
by reference to the law of the place where the con-
tract is made and not by reference to the law of the 
forum, Dunn v. Welsh ( 1879) 62 Ga. 241, and Bax-
ter Nat. Bank v. Talbot (1891) 154 Mass. 213, 38 
N.E. 163, 13 L.R.A. 52, because the law of the place 
where the acts occur determines their operative ef-
fect. The procedure to be followed in hearings on 
commitments in extradition proceedings is deter-
mined by reference to the law of the forum, but such 
procedural rules do not give rise to a right in the 
defendants to introduce evidence made irrelevant by 
treaty between the United States and a foreign 
country, Collins v. Loysel (1922) 259 U.S. 309, 
66 L. Ed. 956, 42 Sup. Ct. 469. 
(b) SINCE THE ACTS OF APPELLANT IN SAID 
12 
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JURISDICTIONS HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT, AP-
PELLANT WAS PRIVILEGED NOT TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTIONS BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 78-24-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
reads as follows : 
"A witness must answer questions legal 
and pertinent to the matter in issue although 
his answer may establish a claim against 
himself; but he need not give an answer which 
will have a tendency to subject him to punish-
ment for a felony; nor need he give an answer 
which will have a direct tendency to degrade 
his character unless it is to the very fact in 
iss~te or to a fact from which the fact in issue 
would be presumed. But a witness must 
answer as to the fact of his previous convic-
tion of felony." (Italics added.) 
As above set forth, supra page 5, the causes 
of action for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation are abolished in the jurisdictions con-
cerning which appellant was interrogated. By the 
express wording of the statutes abolishing the causes 
of action the acts of appellant in those jurisdictions 
do not have operative effect. The questions asked of 
appellant were not, therefore, directed to the fact 
in issue or a fact from which the fact in issue could 
be inferred. The questions asked of appellant had a 
direct tendency to degrade his character. Appellant 
was, therefore, privileged not to answer the ques-
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Appellant is now married to respondent's for-
mer wife. Respondent and respondent's former wife 
have four minor children. Appellant has two minor 
children. Since the acts of appellant inquired about 
are not operative and do not give rise to any rights 
whatever in favor of respondent, we submit that 
requiring appellant to answer those questions would 
serve only to subject appellant, respondent's former 
wife and the six minor children of the parties to 
extreme embarrassment, annoyance and humiliation. 
POINT II 
SAID ORDER VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THAT THE ANSWERS TO 
SAID QUESTIONS WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE 
APPELLANT. 
The questions propounded to appellant at the 
taking of the deposition consisted of preliminary 
questions as to appellant's whereabouts on particu-
lar occasions, immediately followed by questions as 
to whether or not appellant saw respondent's former 
wife on those occasions and invariably culminating 
in questions as to whether or not appellant and re-
spondent's former wife had sexual intercourse on 
those occasions, all of which formed a link in the line 
of questions tending to show that appellant had com-
mitted adultery with respondent's former wife. The 
questions were also directed at whether or not ap-
pellant had transported respondent's former wife 
14 
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across state lines and into Canada for immoral pur-
poses. 
That the facts sought to be elicited constituted 
adultery under the laws of New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wyoming and Idaho and the 
crime of transporting a female person in interstate 
and foreign commerce for immoral purposes in vio-
lation of the Federal Mann Act, see record pp. 44-45. 
That a person is not required to testify to facts 
that may tend to incriminate him under the laws . 
of another jurisdiction, see: United States v. Saline / 
Bank ( 1828) 1 Pet. 100, 7 L. Ed. 69; Ballman v. 
Fagin ( 1905) 200 U.S. 186, 26 Sup. Ct. 212, 50 L. 
Ed. 433; United States v. Lombardo (1915, D.C. 
Wash.) 228 Fed. 980; InReDoyle (1930, D.C.N.Y.) 
42 Fed. 2d 686; Morse v. Nussbaum ( 1900) 55 App. 
Div. 245, 67 N.Y.S. 492; In Re Kanter ( 1902, D.C. 
N.Y.) 117 Fed. 356; and, In Re Feldstein (1900, 
D.C.N.Y.) 103 Fed. 269. 
In United States v. Saline Bank the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the federal court 
for the district of Virginia in holding that the pri-
vilege against self-incrimination applied to matters 
that would tend to incriminate the defendants under 
state law. The court, speaking through Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, said at 1 Pet. p. 104: 
"This is a bill in equity for a discovery 
and relief. The defendants set up a plea in 
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bar, alleging that the discovery would subject 
them to penalties under the statute of Vir-
ginia. The court below decided in favor of the 
validity of the plea and dismissed the bill. 
It is apparent that in every step of the suit 
the facts required to be discovered in support 
of the suit would expose the parties to danger. 
The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound 
to make any discovery which would expose 
him to penalty, and this case falls within it. 
The decree of the court below is therefore 
affirmed.'' 
In Ballman v. Fagin it was held that a witness 
called before a federal grand jury could refuse, un-
der the claim of privilege against incrimination, to 
produce a cash book and could refuse to disclose 
whether or not he had control thereof because to do 
so might tend to show him guilty of a criminal stock 
transaction in violation of state law. The supreme 
court, speaking through Justice Holmes, said at 
200 u.s. p. 195: 
"The subject under investigation, accord-
ing to the government's statement, was the 
criminal liability of some employee of a na-
tional bank from the vaults of which a large 
amount of casl1 had disappeared. The book 
very possibly may have disclosed dealings with 
the person or persons naturally suspected, 
and, especially in view of the charges that 
Ballman kept a 'bucket shop', dealings of a 
nature likely to lead to a charge that Ballman 
was an abettor of the guilty man. If he was, 
he was guilty of a misdemeanor under revised 
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statute Section 5209, and no more bound to 
produce the book than to give testimony to the 
facts which is disclosed. 
"Not impossibly Ballman took this aspect 
of the matter for granted, as one which would 
be perceived by the court without his disa-
greeably emphasizing his own fears. But he 
did call attention to another less likely to be 
known. As we have said, he set forth that 
there were many proceedings on foot against 
him as a party to a 'bucket shop' and so sub-
ject to the criminal law of the state in which 
the grand jury was sitting. According to 
United States v. Saline Bank, he was exoner-
ated from disclosures which would have ex-
posed him to the penalties of the state law." 
In United States v. Lombardo the court held 
that defendant was privileged not to make certain 
sworn statements under federal law pertaining to 
prostitution because the statements might tend to 
show him guilty of operating a house of prostitution 
under the laws of the State of Washington. In so 
holding the court said at 228 Fed. p. 981: 
"The contention of the government that 
Brown v. Walker is controlling is not ac-
cepted. In the Brown case the immunity 
granted by the act was held as broad as the 
fifth amendment by a majority of the supreme 
court, and this immunity amendment was 
passed by congress after the decision in the 
Counselman case, presumably for the purpose 
of meeting the objection urged in that case. 
The minority of the court by a dissenting 
opinion held the immunity provision not broad 
17 
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enough to meet the provisions of the fifth 
amendment. The immunity granted by this 
act is expressly limited to prosecutions 'under 
the laws of the United States' thus withdraw-
ing the protection granted by the fifth amend-
ment as to prosecutions under the state laws 
and a·bridging the protection granted by Sec-
tion 9, Article 1 of the Constitution of Wash-
ington, which is not in harmony with the pri-
vileges and immunities granted to the citizens 
of the several states and inhibitions placed 
upon the several states by the Constitution of 
the United States." 
In the case of In Re Doyle the federal court 
held that, under the-privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the witness in a grand jury investigation 
could refuse to answer certain questions which 
might tend to prove him guilty of splitting fees with 
public officials in violation of the criminal laws of 
the State of New York. 
In the case of In Re Feldstein the witness was 
-interrogated before the referee in bankruptcy re-
garding certain checks which had been given by the 
bankrupt to the -witness. The object of the examina-
tion was to ascertain the consideration for those 
checks and to ascertain whether they were given for 
gambling debts which the trustee might recover by 
action against the witness. The penal code of the 
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State of New York made gambling a criminal of-
fense. The court held that requiring the witness to 
answer the questions might tend to incriminate him 
under the laws of the state and therefore that his 
privilege applied and he did not have to answer the 
questions. 
In Morse v. Nussbaum it was held that an of-
ficer of a corporation could claim the privilege 
.against self-incrimination in an examination under 
a New York act suppressing monopolies, though the 
act assumed to grant immunity to a witness for all 
offenses on account of any transa_ction concerning 
vvhich he might testify, since the state act could 
grant no immunity to prosecution under federal 
laws and since the testimony of the witness would 
be likely to subject him to prosecution under existing 
federal anti-trust laws. 
It is stated by certain text writers that there 
is a conflict of authorities on the proposition of )1 
whether or not the privilege against self-incrimina- ; 
tion extends to the possibility of criminal prosecu- : 
t 
tion under the laws of another jurisdiction. See: 58 i 
Am. J ur., Witnesses, Sec. 51; 82 A.L.R. 1380; and 1 
Vol. VII Wigmore On Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2258. 
The cases cited by appellant above are direct holdings 
that the privilege does extend to testimony that would 
tend to incriminate under the laws of another juris-
diction. Brown v. Walker (1896) 161 U.S. 591, 40 L. 
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Ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, and Hale v. Henkel 
(1906) 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
370, are the two main cases cited by the text writers 
as authority for the contrary view. In both Brown 
v. Walker and Hale v. Henkel the court held that the 
federal immunity statute involved afforded absolute 
immunity from prosecution both under federal and 
state law for the offenses to which the questions re-
lated and hence the witness was required to answer 
because his testimony could not, by reason of the 
immunity, incriminate him u11der federal law or 
the laws of any other jurisdiction. In Jack v. Kansas 
( 1905) 199 U.S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
73, also cited by the text writers as authority for 
the contrary view, the court held that the witness in 
a state anti-trust proceeding was only required to 
answer questions pertaining to intrastate matters, 
as to which a state immunity statute granted com-
plete im1nunity fron1 state prosecution, and that the 
witness was not required to answer as to interstate 
matters and, therefore, he was not compelled to give 
evidence that n1ight tend to incriminate him under 
federal law. See United States v. Lo1nbardo and In 
Doyle, supra p. 15, distingtlishing the above cases 
and the other authorities cited by the text writers 
on the same g·rotu1ds. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ASSESSING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST APPELLANT. 
We submit that appellant's refusal to answer 
the questions was meritorious and that substantial 
justification existed therefor. The court therefore 
committed error in assessing attorney's fees against 
appellant. See Rule 37 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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